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Too Many and Yet Too Few: New
Principles to Define the Proper Limits
for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction
by
SARA SUN BEALE*
Introduction
The scope of the federal government's criminal authority has ex-
panded significantly in the last quarter of the twentieth century, and
the pace of this expansion has accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s.1
Congress responded to increasing public concern about violent crime
by enacting a number of new federal offenses such as carjacking, new
firearms offenses, and legislation specifically aimed at violent career
criminals.2 Congress also created new federal crimes to deal with a
variety of other societal ills such as the failure to pay child support,
fraud in connection with identification documents, computer fraud,
and the disruptive conduct of animal rights activists.3 The 1994 Crime
Bill 4 continued this process of rapid expansion, adding dozens of new
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful to Bob Mosteller
and Robert Shapiro for their comments on an earlier draft, and to William Bryner for
research assistance.
1. For a general description of the history of federal criminal jurisdiction, see Sara
Sun Beale, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AN JusTicE 775-
79 (1983).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1993) (caijacking), § 922(q) (Supp. V 1993) (gun-free
school zones), § 924(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (armed career criminals).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (Supp. V 1993) and § 3563(b)(21) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (child
support), § 1028 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) and § 1738 (1988) (false identification), § 1030
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) (computer fraud and abuse), § 43 (Supp. V 1993) (animal enter-
prise protection).
4. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796 (to be codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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offenses and significantly broadening existing offenses.5 Most of the
new offenses involve some form of violence, including interstate do-
mestic violence, 6 drive-by shootings, violence at international airports,
use of weapons of mass destruction, and providing material support to
terrorists. 7 The 1994 legislation added a number of firearms offenses,
including theft of firearms and explosives, smuggling firearms in aid of
drug trafficking, transfer of a handgun to a juvenile, possession of a
handgun by a juvenile, and receipt of firearms by a nonresident.8 It
also contained a potpourri of offenses not involving violence, includ-
ing theft of major artwork, crimes by or affecting persons engaged in
the business of insurance, and mailing of injurious animals, plant
pests, and illegally taken fish, wildlife, and plants. 9
In general, these new statutes have been layered over the existing
federal criminal statutes. As a result, there are now more than 3,000
federal crimes.10 By the mid-1990s, the accumulation of new statutes
had reversed the pattern that held for the first century of the nation:
the bulk of the federal criminal code now treats conduct that is also
5. For example, the 1994 legislation extended the reach of the Mail Fraud Act to
cases in which the defendant employed a "private or commercial interstate carrier," such
as United Parcel Service, and added attempt provisions to the robbery, kidnapping, smug-
gling, and property damage statutes. Id. §§ 250006, 320903, 108 Stat. 1796, 2087, 2124-25.
6. The statute defines the offense as crossing a state line (or leaving Indian country)
with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate the person's spouse or intimate partner and
causing bodily injury to such spouse or partner. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2261 (West Supp. 1995).
7. 18 U.S.C.A. § 36 (West Supp. 1995) (drive-by shootings), § 37 (West Supp. 1995)
(airport violence), § 2332a (West Supp. 1995) (weapons of mass destruction), § 2339A
(West Supp. 1995) (material support to terrorists). Other crimes of violence added by the
1994 legislation are murder by a federal prisoner, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1118 (West Supp. 1995),
murder of United States nationals abroad, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1119 (West Supp. 1995), violence
against maritime navigation and against fixed maritime platforms, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2280
(West Supp. 1995), killing persons aiding federal investigations or state corrections officers,
18 U.S.C.A. § 1121 (West Supp. 1995), receiving the proceeds of extortion, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 880 (West Supp. 1995), and receiving the proceeds of postal robbery, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2114(b) (West Supp 1995).
8. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 924(a)(k) & (b)(k) (West Supp. 1995) (theft of firearms and explo-
sives); § 9240) (West Supp. 1995) (smuggling firearms in aid of drug trafficking);
§ 922(x)(1) (West Supp. 1995) (transfer of handgun to juvenile); § 922(x)(2) (West Supp.
1995) (possession of handgun by juvenile); § 922(a)(9) (West Supp. 1995) (receipt of fire-
arm by nonresident).
9. 18 U.S.C.A. § 668 (West Supp. 1995) (theft of major artwork); § 1033 (West Supp.
1995) (insurance crimes); § 1716D (West Supp. 1995) (mailing of injurious or illegally
gained animals and plants).
10. The figure 3,000 is taken from Hon. Roger J. Miner, Crime and Punishment in the
Federal Courts, 43 SYRAcusE L. REv. 681, 681 (1992). Though it has been only two years
since the publication of Judge Miner's article, many new offenses have been enacted since
then, including those in the 1994 Crime Bill.
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subject to regulation under the states' general police powers.1 The
new federal criminal provisions do not preempt state law. Instead,
they permit dual jurisdiction by both federal and state authorities.
The thesis of this Article is that there are presently both too many
federal criminal prosecutions and too few. There is ample evidence
that there are presently too many federal criminal prosecutions, and
this point has been made convincingly elsewhere.12 I shall argue that
there are too many federal criminal prosecutions as measured by both
the present and future capacity of the federal courts and, though this
is more debatable, as measured by the proper balance of federal and
state responsibility. This difficulty cannot be resolved by the addition
of more federal judges because the expansion of the federal courts on
the scale required would fundamentally alter their character and
throw into question their ability to perform their constitutional role.
Moreover, there are sound reasons for the states rather than the fed-
eral government to play the leading role in general criminal enforce-
ment. According to this reasoning, the number of federal criminal
prosecutions should be reduced-certainly not expanded-in order to
safeguard the functioning of the federal courts and to reintroduce a
better balance between the state and federal governments.
I will also argue for a seemingly inconsistent point: there are too
few federal criminal prosecutions. When Congress has chosen to leg-
islate by adding new federal crimes, it has neither preempted state law
as a formal matter nor provided sufficient resources to supplant state
enforcement as a practical matter. Federal authorities typically have
the resources to prosecute only a fraction, often only a tiny fraction, of
the offenses that fall under the purview of many of the federal crimi-
nal statutes. The remaining offenses of a similar character continue to
be prosecuted by the states. This arrangement is deeply problematic
11. Prior to the Civil War, only a small number of federal offenses existed, and there
was little if any overlap between the offenses subject to federal and state prosecution. Fed-
eral crimes were limited to those necessary to prevent injury to or interference with the
federal government and its programs. The principal antebellum federal crimes were (1)
acts threatening the existence of the federal government (e.g., treason); (2) misconduct of
federal officers (e.g., bribery); (3) interference with the operation of the federal courts
(e.g., perjury); and (4) interference with other governmental programs (e.g., theft of gov-
ernment property and revenue fraud). See Beale, supra note 1, at 776. For commentary on
this shift in the function of federal criminal law, see William Van Alstyne, Dual Sover-
eignty, Federalism, and National Criminal Law: Modernist Constitutional Doctrine and the
Nonrole of the Supreme Court, 26 AM. CRiM. L. Rlv. 1740 (1989).
12. See e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrrEE 4-10, 35-38
(1990) (federal courts nearing caseload crisis, most pressing problems stem from unprece-
dented number of narcotics prosecutions).
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because it is increasingly clear that similarly situated offenders now
receive radically different sentences in federal and state court. The
mismatch between the wide sweep of the federal criminal statutes and
the relatively limited federal resources-both prosecutorial and judi-
cial-virtually guarantees the continuation of this disparity among of-
fenders who are similarly situated in every respect except one:
whether they are prosecuted in state or federal court. This structur-
ally produced inequality is increasing because of the expanded scope
of federal criminal law and the disparity between the stringent
sentences applicable under federal law and the more lenient discre-
tionary sentencing regimes of many states. This increasing structural
disparity is incompatible with the premises of the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1994.13 The Sentencing Reform Act established the Federal
Sentencing Commission and authorized the promulgation of sentenc-
ing guidelines in order to eliminate the unjustified sentencing dispari-
ties within the federal system. Given the large pool of similar cases
subject to dual jurisdiction under many federal offenses, the deliberate
selection of only a handful of those cases for harsher treatment in fed-
eral court reintroduces the same disparity that Congress sought to
eliminate when it reformed the federal sentencing process. Thus, in
this sense, there are too few federal prosecutions.
Parts I and II of this Article marshal the arguments supporting
the seemingly conflicting claims that there are both too many federal
prosecutions and too few. Part III seeks to develop a principle to limit
federal jurisdiction in order to avoid both of the difficulties identified
in Parts I and II. Prior efforts to develop principles to limit federal
criminal jurisdiction have attempted to define when a sufficiently
strong federal interest exists to warrant federal prosecution. The diffi-
culty with the resulting principles is that they have been far too expan-
sive. Like the constitutional power available to Congress under the
Commerce Clause, principles defining federal interests almost inevita-
bly lead to more criminal legislation than fits comfortably within the
structure of the federal courts and more than Congress is willing to
pay to have generally enforced. Accordingly, Part III argues that the
principles for identifying a sufficient federal interest should be cou-
pled with additional mechanisms that will tailor the federal criminal
caseload to fit the inherent size limitations of the federal courts. Such
principles should not rely on a system of intermittent federal enforce-
13. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 211, 98 Stat. 1987
(1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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ment that necessarily introduces unjustified sentencing disparities
among similarly situated defendants,
Part III proposes a disaggregation of the concept of federal crimi-
nal jurisdiction in order to separate the question of when federal judi-
cial resources should be employed from the broader question of when
some form of federal regulation or resources may be warranted. Con-
gress may provide support to state and local criminal justice efforts by
many means other than creating federal crimes that must be prose-
cuted in the federal courts. Because of the small size of the federal
courts, Part III argues that there should be a presumption in favor of
using other means, including, if necessary, the prosecution of some
federal crimes in the state courts. In general, Congress should provide
for the prosecution of crime in the federal courts only when the
unique resources of the federal judicial system-not federal resources
in general-are necessary. Part III also proposes a significant change
in prosecutorial charging policy. Because acceptance of the principle
of disaggregation by itself will probably not be sufficient to match the
criminal caseload to the capacity of the courts, it will still be necessary
for federal prosecutors to exercise some charging discretion. Part III
proposes that, in order to avoid unjustified sentencing disparities,
prosecutorial discretion must shift from the present model of individ-
ual case discretion to the definition of categories of cases that will be
subject to general federal prosecution.
I. Too Many Criminal Prosecutions: Impairing the
Functioning of the Federal Courts and Trenching on
State Authority
The explosion of new federal criminal statutes has serious costs.
Perhaps the most visible cost is the burden imposed on the relatively
small federal judicial system. As detailed below, the increasing crimi-
nal caseload threatens to impair the quality of the justice meted out in
criminal cases and significantly impairs federal judges' ability to per-
form their core constitutional functions in civil cases. One logical re-
sponse to this difficulty would be to greatly enlarge the federal courts
to correspond with the expansion of federal statutory jurisdiction over
crime. This would be a mistake. The federal courts cannot be en-
larged indefinitely without completely altering their character in ways
inimical to their constitutional functions of interpreting federal statu-
tory and constitutional law. Moreover, such an expansion of the fed-
eral courts would take the federal government even further into areas
better left to the states in our federal system.
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A. The Impact of the Expansion of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction
(1) Increases in the Criminal Caseload and in the Resources Allocated to
Criminal Cases
Between 1980 and 1992, the number of criminal cases filed in the
federal courts increased by 70 percent (from 27,968 to 47,472) and the
number of defendants prosecuted rose 78 percent (from 38,033 to
67,632).14 The increase in federal drug and firearm offenses was even
sharper. The number of drug cases filed in the federal courts roughly
quadrupled, from 3,130 cases (6,678 defendants) to 12,833 cases
(25,033 defendants). 15 Firearms prosecutions also quadrupled, from
931 prosecutions in 1980 to 3,917 in 1992.16 Annual criminal case fil-
ings per sitting judge increased from 58 to 84 during the same pe-
riod.17 Criminal filings in the appellate courts have also doubled since
1980.18
The real impact of the criminal docket, however, comes not so
much from the absolute number of cases as the proportion of re-
sources they consume. In absolute numbers, the current caseload is
not unprecedented.' 9 The criminal caseload has fluctuated widely
since 1960, and the number of federal criminal prosecutions was ap-
proximately the same in 1972 as it is today.20 Indeed, federal criminal
filings actually account for a smaller percentage of the federal courts'
caseload than they did in 1972.21
14. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR A-56 tbl. D-2; ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1992 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 248 tbl. D-2.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3 (1994).
18. Id.
19. The number of federal criminal cases reached its all-time high in 1932, as a flood
of Prohibition cases swelled the total number of cases to 92,174, more than 2 1/2 times the
total number of cases in 1918, the last year before Prohibition. Edward Rubin, A Statistical
Study of Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 494, 497 tbl. 1 (1934).
For a discussion of the problems caused by this enormous expansion in caseload, see NA-
TIONAL COMM. ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT
OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 722, 71st Cong., 3d
Sess. 55-58 (1931). Other significant spikes occurred during periods when war-related and
selective service cases were prosecuted. See Rubin, supra, at 497 tbl. 1 (19,830 "war cases"
in 1920 compared to a total prewar caseload of 19,628 three years earlier).
20. FEDERAL JUDICIAL OrR., supra note 17, at 31 n.84 (47,043 criminal cases were
filed in 1972, and 47,467 cases were filed in 1992). See also id at 51 fig. 1 (graphically
depicting criminal caseload from 1960 to 1992).
21. Today criminal cases account for only 17% of all filings in the district courts, com-
pared with roughly 1/3 of all filings in 1972. Moreover, given the substantial increase in the
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Criminal cases are consuming an increasing share of federal judi-
cial resources. Though criminal cases presently account for only sev-
enteen percent of the total federal judicial docket, they take up a
disproportionate share of judicial resources-indeed the lion's share
in some judicial districts. For example, in the Southern District of
Florida, district judges spend eighty-four percent of their trial time on
criminal cases, leaving only sixteen percent for a wide range of civil
cases 2 By 1992, thirty-eight of the ninety-two federal districts de-
voted more than fifty percent of their trial dockets to criminal cases.23
Some district judges have been unable to try a civil case for a year or
more . 4
Several factors appear to account for the increased share of fed-
eral judicial resources being consumed by criminal cases. First, the
cases themselves are different today than at any time in the past, and
they require more judicial resources. Twenty years ago the federal
caseload included a substantial number of relatively straightforward
offenses that could typically be disposed of quickly. Selective service
offenses, auto theft, forgery, and counterfeiting accounted for twenty-
three percent of federal defendants charged in 1972, and only four
percent in 1992.25 Only eighteen percent of federal defendants were
charged with drug offenses in 1972, in contrast to forty-one percent in
1992.26 Not only have drug filings increased, but the nature of the
charges in drug cases has also changed, with the percentage of drug
distribution cases increasing and the percentage of the simpler posses-
sion cases decreasing sharply.27 The effect of this change is substan-
tial. A Federal Judicial Center (FJC) time study found that cocaine
size of the federal judiciary, there are substantially fewer criminal case filings per district
judge in 1992 than in 1972. Compare ADwSN'rs rrRA OFFICE OF m U.S. COURTS, 1992
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DmEcrOR 54, 64-65 with AD mSTRATrvn OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, 1972 ANNUAL REPORT OF T-E DlncroR 108 tbl. 15.
22. Judge Stanley Marcus, Speech at the Western Regional Conference on State-Fed-
eral Judicial Relationships 4 (June 5, 1993) (transcript on file with the Hastings Law
Journal).
23. AD MISTRATVE OFFicE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Tim CRIMINAL CASELOAD: Tim
NATURE OF CHANGE 1 (1994) [hereinafter T-m CRUMNAL CASELOAD].
24. Miner, supra note 10, at 686 (quoting a judge from the Eastern District of New
York). See also Stephen Labaton, New Tactics in the War on Drugs Tilt Scales of Justice Off
Balance, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 29, 1989, at Al, A18 (district judge only able to try one civil jury
case in two years, has 20 civil cases ready for trial but neither time nor resources to begin
trial).
25. Tim CRrMINAL CASELOAD, supra note 23, at 5-6 figs. 4, 6.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 7.
April 1995]
and heroin distribution cases take four times as much judicial time per
defendant as cases involving possession of the same drugs.28
While the overall percentage of multiple defendant cases has re-
mained fairly stable since the early 1970s, the number of multi-defend-
ant cases has grown by seventy percent since 1980, and the number of
multi-defendant drug cases has grown by thirty percent in just the last
four years.29 The number of jury trials with more than one defendant
increased by thirty-five percent in the last four years.30 Multi-defend-
ant cases are more complex, and they consume far more judicial re-
sources than cases involving a single defendant. A recent FJC time
study found that the average judge time per defendant was 5.8 hours
in multi-defendant cases, but only 3.0 hours in single defendant
cases.
31
The number of federal criminal trials is at an all-time high-ten
percent higher than the previous high reported in 1970.32 Perhaps
even more important, federal criminal trials are getting longer. In
1970 the average length of a criminal jury trial in federal court was 2.5
days; it is now 4.4 days.33 Very long trials are now commonplace:
criminal trials in the 6 to 20-day range have increased 118 percent
since 1973.34
Another very significant change in the federal system is the in-
creased judicial time being devoted to sentencing. The Sentencing
Guidelines, which went into effect in 1987, require extensive factual
findings and legal conclusions in each case. The Guidelines have sig-
nificantly increased the time district judges spend on sentencing. 35
Sentencing appeals have also resulted in an increased burden on the
courts of appeals. Each year from 1990 to 1993, appeals raising sen-
tencing issues alone accounted for at least twenty-six percent of crimi-
28. Id. at 8 (distribution cases take an average of 6 hours compared with 1.5 hours for
possession cases). Marijuana cases show a similar pattern. Id.
29. THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD, supra note 23, at 1.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 12.
33. Id. at 1.
34. Id.
35. Ninety percent of federal district judges surveyed by the Federal Courts Study
Committee stated that sentencing had become more time consuming, with more than half
reporting an increase of at least 25% and a third reporting an increase of more than 50% in
the time required for sentencing. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrIrEE,
supra note 12, at 137.
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nal appeals in cases subject to the Guidelines. 36 Prior to the reform of
the sentencing process, few if any of these appeals could have been
brought. The appeal of sentencing issues has made appeals from con-
victions more complex and difficult to resolve, and most appeals from
convictions now also raise one or more sentencing issues. In 1993, for
example, only thirty percent of criminal appeals did not involve a sen-
tencing issue, and that percentage falls to fifteen percent if the calcula-
tions are based exclusively on cases to which the Guidelines are
applicable 37 These changes flowing from the reform of the sentenc-
ing process have a substantial effect on the workload of the courts of
appeals since criminal appeals now account for approximately one-
fourth of the appellate caseload.3 8
Another factor, which has not been noted generally, has also re-
sulted in an increased allocation of judicial time to sentencing issues in
criminal cases. The overall conviction rate has increased substantially
since the 1970s. Two decades ago, the conviction rate was approxi-
mately seventy-five percent; it has risen gradually and is now holding
steady at roughly eighty-five percent.39 Though the number of prose-
cutions was nearly the same in 1972 as in 1992, there were 37,220 con-
victions in 1972 and 50,260 in 1992.40 As noted above, this larger
number of defendants must be sentenced in accordance with more
time-consuming procedures.
(2) Corresponding Decline in the Resources Available for Civil Cases
The increased criminal caseload has an inevitable impact on the
remainder of the federal courts' dockets. Criminal cases receive top
priority because of the Speedy Trial Act, which requires dismissal of
charges that are not brought within specified time periods.41 While
36. The calculations in notes 36 and 37 were based upon data provided in a memoran-
dum from Marilyn Ducharme of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to the author
(copy on file with the Hastings Law Journa). The calculations include only classified cases
to which the Guidelines were applicable, excluding a small number of cases (612 in 1993) in
which the type of appeal was not classified. Although the Guidelines became effective on
November 1, 1987, there are still some non-Guidelines appeals (1,870 in 1993).
37. These calculations are based exclusively on classified cases, excluding the few
cases (612 in 1993) that were not classified.
38. In the twelve months ending on March 31, 1993, criminal appeals accounted for
24% of the filings in the courts of appeals. ADMnIsTRATrvE OFFICE OF mE U.S. CouRTS,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS 10 tbl. B-1 (1993).
39. THm CRIMINAL CASELOAD, supra note 23, at 10.
40. ADmrNImSTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1972 ANNuAL REPORT OF THE
DmECToR 381 tbl. D-4; ADMmINSTRATrVE OFFICE OF T=E U.S. COURTS, 1992 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 266 tbl. D-4.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1985).
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the speedy trial clock is tolled during certain pretrial proceedings, 42
the total time allotted-seventy days 43-is so short that the Act places
significant pressure on prosecutors and court personnel. The federal
courts have responded to the increased pressure from the criminal
caseload by reducing the resources available for civil cases. This trend
is most apparent in the case of trial resources.
The total number of trials in the federal system remained rela-
tively constant from 1980 to 1992, at approximately 20,000," but the
number of criminal trials increased while civil trials decreased. Given
the priority accorded to criminal trials, the dramatic expansion of the
criminal trial' docket, the greater percentage of complex cases, and the
increased call on judicial resources for sentencing appeals, it is not
surprising that the resources available for civil trials have been sub-
stantially reduced. Between 1980 and 1993, the number of civil trials
declined by 20 percent (from 13,191 to 10,527) while the number of
criminal trials increased by 43 percent (from 6,634 to 9,465). 45 More-
over, the decline in the number of civil trials has occurred despite the
fact that the civil docket has continued to grow, and indeed has grown
far more rapidly than the criminal docket.46 Because these figures are
based upon national averages, they underrepresent the changes exper-
ienced in districts where the criminal caseload has exploded. As
noted above, in more than one-third of the federal judicial districts
more than one-half of the district courts' trial time is currently allo-
cated to criminal cases.47
(3) Potential for Impairment of the Federal Courts' Core Constitutional
Functions
The federal courts' core constitutional functions are interpreting
federal law, declaring federal rights, and providing a neutral forum for
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1985).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1985); 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1985).
44. There were 19,825 trials in 1980 and 19,992 in 1992. 1993 STATISTICAL ABSTRACt
OF THE UNITED STATES 206 tbl. 332.
45. Id. During this period, while the percentage of civil jury trials decreased slightly,
the percentage of criminal jury trials increased from 52% to 60%. Id. The percentage of
jury trials in civil cases fell from 43% in 1980 to 41% in 1992. Id.
46. The number of civil filings rose from approximately 125,000 in 1975 to approxi-
mately 227,000 in 1992. This represents a slight decrease from the high of 275,000 cases
filed in 1985 before the statutory increase in the required amount in controversy in diver-
sity cases. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 55.
47. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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interstate disputes.48 With less than 650 trial judges nationwide, the
federal judicial system performs a distinctive function not shared by
the much larger state judicial systems. While a full account of the
functions of the federal courts is beyond the scope of this Article, the
general contours can be sketched quickly.
The federal courts have the principal responsibility of interpret-
ing the provisions of the federal Constitution that limit government
authority, including the First Amendment protections of speech and
religion and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment requirements of
equal protection and due process. A related function is the federal
courts' jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions challenging the con-
stitutionality of federal or state confinement.
The federal courts also have the responsibility of interpreting and
applying an enormous range of federal statutory law dealing with sub-
jects as diverse as federal taxation; the regulation of the securities in-
dustry; occupational health and safety; labor and management
relations; the purity and efficacy of drugs; air and highway safety; en-
vironmental regulation; and the cleanup of hazardous wastes. Many
of these statutes implement complex federal regulatory schemes that
could be frustrated if judicial enforcement were not available. En-
forcement in the federal courts implements the underlying federal pol-
icies and ensures uniformity. Other federal statutes forbid
discrimination in employment, housing, education, and lending, and
enforcement of these laws is also available in the federal courts. In
some cases, such as bankruptcy, patent, and trademark law, federal
statutory jurisdiction is exclusive, meaning that parties have no alter-
native to federal judicial proceedings to vindicate their rights.
The federal courts are the forum of choice for other civil ligation
that would be difficult, if not impossible, to accommodate in the state
courts, particularly litigation spanning multiple state lines. Tradition-
ally, the federal courts have also provided a forum for diversity cases
48. The text of Article I reflects these functions. It provides for federal judicial
power in all cases "arising under" the Constitution and laws and treaties of the United
States; it also provides for federal judicial power in a variety of interstate cases, including
controversies between two or more states, between citizens of two or more states, and
between a state and citizens of another state. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2. Interstate cases
played a proportionally larger role in the first century of the federal courts' development
than they do today. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for diversity jurisdiction, 1 Stat. 78,
§ 11, but there was no general federal question jurisdiction until 1875. Act of Mar. 3, 1875,
§ 1, 18 Stat. 470 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1988)).
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and other suits when the neutrality of the state courts might be
questioned.49
As the federal criminal caseload has grown, the federal courts
have performed a necessary triage. Criminal cases have been receiv-
ing priority under the dictates of the federal Speedy Trial Act, and
judicial resources have been diverted from civil to criminal cases. In-
creasingly, civil litigants-from corporations to taxpayers to civil
rights plaintiffs-are finding that the federal courts lack the resources
to permit a complete and timely resolution of their claims.
While the particulars vary from district to district, an example
gives a sense of the tradeoffs involved. In the District of Columbia,
district judges complained publicly in 1991 that the United States At-
torney was bringing minor drug cases (such as the $20 sale of two
rocks of crack cocaine and youthful first offenders arrested as couri-
ers) in federal district court rather than superior court.5 0 The judges
said that the pressure of the criminal caseload had severely disrupted
the court's civil calendar. Civil cases had been postponed or simply
not set for trial, important rulings were delayed, and emergency cases
were routed to the court of appeals because the district judges lacked
the time to consider them.51 The magnitude in the shift is reflected in
requests for jury trials. The number of criminal jury trial requests
grew from 81 in 1986 to 294 in 1990; during the same period, the re-
quests for civil jury trials fell.52 The civil cases that had been put on
hold included a complex consolidation of thirty cases arising from the
collapse of the National Bank of Washington and a challenge to EPA
clean air and water standards.53 In one case involving a constitutional
challenge to the federal government's use of a preemployment urinal-
ysis test, the district judge advised the plaintiff to apply for a prelimi-
49. The amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction has been raised
repeatedly, and there is substantial support for further restrictions on diversity jurisdiction.
See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 25-27 (1994)
(advocating elimination of diversity jurisdiction with narrow exceptions, e.g., when plaintiff
can clearly demonstrate local prejudice in state court or imposition of other limits).
50. Garry Sturgess, Judges Rap Stephens on Drug Cases, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 11, 1991,
at 7.
51. Id. But see Tracy Thompson, Stop Complaining, Stephens Tells Judges; Federal
Jurists Bristle When U.S. Attorney Suggests They Don't Work Very Hard, WASH. PoST, June
8, 1991, at B1, B7 (noting that federal courts in District of Columbia are not as congested
as other districts and that district is 79th of 94 federal districts in number of criminal cases
per district judge).
52. Garry Sturgess, Another Clash Over Criminal Caseload, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 1,
1991, at 7. Requests for civil jury trials fell from 120 to 93. Id.
53. Sturgess, supra note 50.
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nary injunction, which he would deny, so that the case could be heard
immediately in the appellate court.54
B. Constraints Arising from the Size and Structure of the Federal
Judiciary
The information presented in the preceding Section establishes
that the federal courts require additional resources to handle their
growing criminal caseload without giving short shrift to their civil
docket. While some increase in resources is warranted, the federal
judiciary cannot accommodate unlimited increases in its criminal (or
civil) docket by expansion. As the Federal Courts Study Committee
concluded, "The reason that the federal courts cannot accommodate
unlimited increases in the demand for their services by expanding
their personnel lies both in the character of the federal judiciary and
the limitations of the pyramidal three-tier system within which federal
courts now operate. '55 If there were thousands of federal judges,
presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation would be merely
pro forma, and there would be a significant dilution of the prestige
and responsibility that have historically served as chief incentives and
permitted the recruitment of persons of real distinction.5 6 As the
Committee concluded, the structure of the federal courts is also an
obstacle to their enlargement:
The more trial judges there are, the more appeals judges there must
be; the more appeals judges there are, the higher the rate of appeal
... ; the more appeals there are, the more difficult it is for the
Supreme Court to maintain some minimum uniformity of federal
decisional law, because its capacity to review decisions of the lower
54. Id.
55. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL CouRTs STUDY COMm=rrEn, supra note 12, at 7.
56. The Committee concluded:
The independence secured to federal judges by Article III is compatible with re-
sponsible and efficient performance of judicial duties only if federal judges are
carefully selected from a pool of competent and eager applicants and only if they
are sufficiently few in number to feel a personal stake in the consequences of
their actions. Neither condition can be satisfied if there are thousands of federal
judges .... [A] sufficient number of highly qualified applicants could not be
found unless salaries of federal judges were greatly increased; and a judge who
felt like simply a tiny cog in a vast wheel that would turn at the same speed
whatever the judge did would not approach the judicial task with the requisite
sense that power must be exercised responsibly-especially when that judge, by
reason of having life tenure, lacked the usual incentives to perform assigned tasks
energetically and responsibly.
Id. at 7. But see Hon. Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases: A Plea to
Save the Federal Courts, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52 (asserting that the number of federal
appellate judges could be doubled without affecting quality).
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federal courts is limited. Even the maintenance of the necessary
minimum uniformity of law within a single circuit becomes prob-
lematic if there are a great many judges in that circuit, and while
this problem can be alleviated by increasing the number of circuits,
the result is to increase the number of intercircuit conflicts and
hence burden on the Supreme Court... If there were no appeals,
expansion might be a tolerable if not ideal solution. There would be
some dilution of quality and responsibility, but there would not be
chaos. However, given appeals, continuous expansion of the
number of judges at any level.., will lead eventually to paralysis or
incoherence, because of the judicial system's three tier pyramidal
structure. 57
If present trends continue, it will not take long to reach the point
where the current structure of the federal courts cannot be main-
tained, and the character of the federal judicial system will change
radically. A 1994 report prepared for the Judicial Conference esti-
mates that more that 4,000 federal judges will be needed by the year
2020 if the federal caseload continues to increase at the same rate as it
has for the past 50 years.58 A federal judiciary of more than 4,000
judges, hearing more than one million cases annually, would call into
question the concept of judicial federalism that forms the major justi-
fication for the existence of the federal courts. A recent report to the
Judicial Conference makes this point well:
Beyond historical practice, the allocation of limited jurisdiction to
the federal courts is justified both in theory and as a practical neces-
sity. Unless a distinctive role for the federal court system is pre-
served, there is no sound justification for having two systems. If
federal courts were to begin exercising, in the normal course, the
broad range of jurisdiction traditionally allocated to the states, they
would lose both their distinctive nature and, due to burgeoning
dockets, their ability to resolve fairly and efficiently those cases of
clear national import and interest that properly fall within the scope
of federal concern. Under that unfortunate scenario, all courts-
federal and state-might as well be consolidated into a single sys-
tem to handle all judicial business. 59
If we accept the premise that the distinctive role of the federal
judiciary is incompatible with the idea of thousands of Article III fed-
eral judges, it becomes clear that the federal courts will never be able
to accommodate a major share of the criminal litigation in the United
States. The present federal criminal docket-though greatly ex-
57. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 7-8 For
a discussion of the alternatives to the present unified pyramidal structure, see id. at 10-13.
58. COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 49, at 13 tbl. 6, 16 (Draft for
Public Comment, Nov. 1994).
59. Id. at 19.
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panded by the addition of new federal crimes and the provision of
additional resources to the Department of Justice-accounts for no
more than a small fraction of the criminal prosecutions in the United
States. Even after the dramatic expansion of the federal criminal
caseload in the 1980s and 1990s, the states are still handling more than
ninety-five percent of all violent crime prosecutions.60 The over-
whelming proportion of the cases now handled in the state system, the
magnitude of the criminal caseload, and the small size of the federal
judiciary make it crystal clear that the federal government cannot take
over the lion's share of criminal enforcement responsibility. In 1990
state and local authorities made 1.1 million drug arrests,61 and in 1992
there were more than 13 million criminal cases filed in the state
courts.62 Obviously no more than a small fraction of these cases can
be heard by the 649 federal judges on the federal district courts. 63
Doubling, tripling, or even quadrupling the federal judiciary would
still leave the vast bulk of criminal cases in the state courts. Enlarging
the federal courts sufficiently to take on the bulk of these cases would
indeed change their character beyond recognition and be incompati-
ble with their other constitutional functions.
C. Decentralization and Federalism
The current increase in federal criminal jurisdiction is in funda-
mental tension with the values of decentralization promoted by feder-
alism.64 A decentralized federal system is efficient; it permits criminal
60. H. Scott Wallace, The Drive to Federalize Is the Road to Ruin: When Less Is
More, CRim. JUST., Fall 1993, at 8 (quoting OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S.
DEP'T OF JuSTICE, COMBATITNG VIOLENT CRIME 4 (July 1992)).
61. Id. at 53 (citing BUREAU OF JuSTICE STATISTICS, DRUGS, CRIME, AND THE JUS-
Txcn SYSTEM 136 (1992)). In comparison, federal authorities made 22,000 drug arrests dur-
ing the same period. Id.
62. This number, which reflects only 47 states, was calculated from the filings reported
in STATE JUSTIcE INST. & NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STA-
TISTcs, ANNUAL REPORT 1992, at 31 fig. 1.47 (1994). There were 1,188,569 criminal felony
cases filed in the 35 states that provided data to the Institute. Id. at 40 fig. 1.58.
63. It should be noted, however, that state court judges currently have far heavier
caseloads than do federal judges. In 1992 there were 75 criminal cases and 355 civil cases
filed per judge in the federal system; in the state courts of general jurisdiction there were
417 criminal cases and 995 civil cases per judge. Id. at 44 fig. 1.61.
64. A vigorous debate regarding the contemporary importance of federalism is now
underway among academics. Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have argued with consid-
erable force that to the extent American federalism diverges from simple decentralization
it is a counterproductive legacy of history, a collective "neurosis" that should not be per-
mitted to hamper the achievement of national policies. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Fee-
ley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 908 (1994).
Professors Rubin and Feeley nonetheless recognize that states presently serve as the "natu-
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justice policy to be tailored to local conditions and policy preferences;
and it furthers political accountability. The variety inherent in the
federal system also permits desirable experimentation. Indeed, many
of the most promising current trends in criminal enforcement began at
the state and local levels, including specialized drug courts, commu-
nity policing, boot camps, and sentencing guidelines. The values pro-
moted by federalism, which have great force in the context of criminal
enforcement, are threatened by the seemingly inexorable expansion of
federal criminal law.
Many efficiency concerns favor state and local rather than federal
criminal enforcement. Given the vastly larger size of the state judici-
ary, state courts are nearly always geographically closer, and hence
more convenient, for victims, witnesses, jurors, and defendants. The
states, which have long had large criminal dockets, typically have de-
veloped a comprehensive range of social service and outreach pro-
grams that are lacking in the federal courts. Finally, state corrections
programs also have built-in advantages over their federal counter-
parts. Because state corrections institutions are located closer to of-
fenders' home communities, they facilitate contact with family and
reintegration into the community. Federal institutions, by contrast,
draw their inmate populations from a nationwide base, and inmates
may be housed hundreds or even thousands of miles from friends and
family. Sustaining family contact and reintegrating an offender into
his community are inherently more difficult in the federal system. It
should be noted that corrections is an increasingly important aspect of
the federal criminal justice system. Fueled by the expansion of the
federal criminal caseload and the changes in federal sentencing, the
population in the federal prison system has skyrocketed; it now ex-
ceeds the inmate population in forty-nine of the fifty states.
Decentralizing prosecutorial decision making also has substantial
advantages. State criminal laws are enforced by elected state and lo-
cal prosecutors who are intimately familiar with local conditions and
politically accountable to their varied constituencies. In contrast, the
enforcement responsibility for federal criminal law is divided between
the Justice Department in Washington and the local United States At-
torney, who is a presidential appointee. In general, federal prosecu-
tors are responsible for a larger and more diverse geographic area
ral and convenient means to achieve the managerial benefits that flow from decentralizing
certain governmental functions." Id. at 951. Accordingly, this Article refers to the values
of decentralization promoted by federalism.
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than their state counterparts. Federal authorities are inevitably far-
ther from the grass roots than their state and local counterparts.
There are also significant advantages to decentralizing legislative
judgments regarding criminal justice policy. If state rather than fed-
eral law governs, local conditions and the policy preferences of a
smaller community will govern such important matters as the defini-
tion of the conduct that should be criminal and the penalties that
should be imposed. At present, there is considerable variation in
opinion from state to state on the question of what conduct should be
criminalized (as well as what conduct should constitute a defense).65
Sentencing schemes also vary among the states, and state schemes
vary from both the federal Sentencing Guidelines and the federal sen-
tencing statutes.66
It has been suggested that federalism also promotes individual
liberty by dividing power among the federal, state, and local govern-
ments. Perhaps the most obvious aspect of the division of power is
that the United States has no single federal police force. The concen-
tration of power in an integrated national police force might pose a
greater threat to individual liberty than the highly fragmented power
that is presently dispersed among federal, state, and local actors. In
the current situation, for example, there is no single dossier for each
individual.67
On the other hand, the dispersal of power to state and local offi-
cials has not always operated to promote individual liberty. Within
the recent past, some state and local authorities were indifferent, if
not hostile, to the rights of African-American defendants in the South.
The appointment of federal prosecutors and judges might operate to
65. For example, the definition of rape varies considerably from state to state, and
many states are now adopting a variety of stalking laws. Some states criminalize forms of
sexual conduct that are decriminalized or even constitutionally protected in other states. A
few states, such as Montana, have eliminated the insanity defense, while others recognize
different forms of the defense (e.g., M'Naghten Test, MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02 (1985)).
Such examples could be multiplied indefinitely.
66. For a general discussion of the variety of state guidelines and the differences be-
tween the various state models and the federal sentencing guidelines, see Richard S. Frase,
Sentencing Guidelines in the States: Lessons for State and Federal Reformers, 6 FED. SEN-
TENCING REP. 123 (1993), an overview of the articles in an issue analyzing the sentencing
schemes in various states.
67. The importance of this fragmentation of information is decreasing as even state
and local officials gain access to the Information Superhighway. For example, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation now allows all duly authorized law enforcement agencies access to
the National Crime Information Center.
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buffer such defendants from local prejudices and political pressures. 68
The dispersal of criminal jurisdiction has also operated as a barrier to
the adoption of a national code of criminal procedure (like those pres-
ently in operation in many other nations) that would provide a uni-
form, threshold level of procedural protection for all defendants
throughout the United States.69
I. Too Few Criminal Prosecutions: Inequality Between
Defendants Prosecuted for the Same Conduct in the
State and Federal Systems
An equally serious problem with the present state of affairs is
that there are too few federal prosecutions to ensure the equal treat-
ment of identically situated defendants. As noted above, the incur-
sion of federal criminal law into areas already subject to state criminal
laws has not displaced state enforcement; rather it has created an in-
creasing area of dual criminal jurisdiction. Significant differences be-
tween state and federal law on critical subjects such as sentencing
dictate that defendants who have performed precisely the same con-
duct receive very different treatment depending upon where they are
prosecuted. The current federal criminal statutes reach far more con-
duct than can be prosecuted in the federal courts. While federal crim-
inal enforcement is the norm in a few areas subject to dual
jurisdiction, such as securities violations, in general, federal prosecu-
tors bring only a few of the cases that fall under many of the statutes
in areas of dual federal-state jurisdiction. As a result, those few de-
fendants prosecuted in federal court receive significantly different-
and usually higher-sentences than they would have if they, like many
others, had been prosecuted for the same conduct in state court. The
resulting inequality is completely at odds with the contemporary
movement, exemplified by the federal Sentencing Guidelines, to en-
sure that similarly situated offenders receive the same sentence.
68. Indeed, a national police force might also contribute to individual liberty if it
adopted more selective employment criteria and operating procedures and achieved higher
levels of training than small state and local police forces can afford.
69. See generally CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
REVOLUTION (1993) (arguing in favor of a national code of criminal procedure that would
be easier for criminal justice officials to understand, internalize, and obey than Supreme
Court decisions adjudicating particular cases). Professor Bradley argues that Congress can
authorize the promulgation of such rules under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 146.
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A. Disparity Among Defendants
The expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction has led to serious
inequalities among similarly situated defendants with regard to sen-
tencing as well as significant procedural rights. Disparity has been
fostered because the contemporary expansion of federal jurisdiction
has not been accompanied by preemption of existing state criminal
laws. Federal law has simply been layered over existing state law to
produce dual jurisdiction. Despite the phenomenal expansion of dual
federal-state jurisdiction, federal law differs from state law on signifi-
cant matters of procedure, the definition of the relevant crimes and
defenses, and, perhaps most importantly, the sentences applicable to
various offenses. 70 Dual jurisdiction means that offenders are subject
to a kind of cruel lottery, in which a small minority of the persons who
commit a particular offense is selected for federal prosecution and
subjected to much harsher sentences-and often to significantly less
favorable procedural or substantive standards-than persons prose-
cuted for parallel state offenses. The structural disparity fostered by
the new regime of dual jurisdiction is at odds with the premise of the
federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Dual federal-state criminal jurisdiction is now the rule rather than
the exception. Federal law reaches at least some instances of each of
the following state offenses: theft,7 1 fraud,72 extortion,73 bribery,74 as-
70. Of course, the precise content of state law varies between jurisdictions on many of
the matters in question here. Despite this variance, some generalizations may be made.
Frst, federal sentences are generally longer than state sentences for the same conduct.
Frase, supra note 66, at 123 (noting that state guidelines generally have different balance
on issues of sentencing severity and flexibility than federal guidelines). Second, the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure provide a defendant with fewer procedural rights related
to joinder, severance, and pretrial discovery than the rules in force in many states. See, eg.,
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. IsRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 17.1(b) (2d ed. 1992)
(noting that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) permits prosecutor to join offenses of
a similar character; most states do not provide for such joinder because of risk of convic-
tion upon weight of accusations or accumulation of evidence); id. § 17.2(g) (Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 14 allows severance only upon showing of prejudice by the defense,
while some states grant defendant severance as a matter of right); id. § 20.3(h) (noting that
federal rules, unlike rules in many states, do not require prosecutor to provide defendants
with a list of the names and addresses of witnesses prosecution intends to call; some states
also require that the prosecutor provide the names and addresses of others who have
knowledge of relevant facts).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1988) (theft from interstate shipment); cf 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312,2313
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) (interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles), §§ 2314, 2315
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) (interstate transportation of stolen property).
72. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. V 1993) (mail fraud), § 1343 (Supp. V 1993) (wire
fraud), § 1344 (Supp. V 1993) (bank fraud).
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sault,75 domestic violence, 76 robbery,77 murder,78 weapons offenses,79
and drug offenses. 80 In many instances, federal law overlaps almost
completely with state law, as is the case with drug offenses.
The sentences available in a federal prosecution are generally
higher than those available in state court-often ten or even twenty
times higher. For example, in one drug case the recommended state
sentence was eighteen months, while federal law required a
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years, and the applicable federal
sentencing guidelines range was 151 to 188 months for one defendant
and 188 to 235 months for the other.81 Another defendant subject to a
five-year mandatory minimum in federal court would have been eligi-
ble for a sentence of zero to ninety days in state court as a first of-
fender.82 A defendant who was placed on two years probation in state
73. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1985) (interference with commerce by extortion), 93 891-
94 (1988) (extortionate credit transactions).
74. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (bribery of federal official), § 224
(1988) (sports bribery), § 666 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (federal program bribery), § 1952
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) (interstate travel in aid of bribery).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1988) (assault on federally protected persons), § 1501 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) (assault on process server), § 1751 (1988) (assault on president and vice
president).
76. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2261 (West Supp. 1995) (interstate domestic violence).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988) (interference with interstate commerce by threats of
violence).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1116 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (murder of foreign officials, official
guests, and internationally protected persons), § 1117 (1988) (conspiracy to commit mur-
der); 18 U.S.C.S. § 1120 (Law. Co-op. 1994) (murder by escaped federal prisoner); 21
U.S.C. § 675 (1988) (murder of federal meat inspector). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) (use of interstate commerce facilities in commission of murder-for-hire).
79. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 922 includes the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q) (Supp. V 1993)).
80. E.g., 21 U.S.C § 841 (1981) (manufacture, distribution, and possession with the
intent to distribute), § 846 (drug conspiracy), § 848 (drug kingpin).
81. United States v. Williams, 746 F. Supp. 1076, 1078-79 (D. Utah 1990), rev'd on
other grounds, 963 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1992).
82. United States v. Oakes, 11 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1569
(1994). The defendants in Oakes and the cases cited infra were all subject to both federal
and state prosecution for the same conduct. The increasing area of jurisdictional overlap
also increases the number of individuals who are subject to prosecution in both the federal
and the state systems. The Supreme Court has held that duplicative prosecutions of this
nature do not violate the double jeopardy clause under the dual sovereignty doctrine. Ab-
bate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). The
Supreme Court reaffirmed the dual sovereignty doctrine in 1985. Heath v. Alabama, 474
U.S. 82 (1985). The international community, in contrast, regards duplicative prosecutions
as violative of fundamental human rights, even within a federal system. See International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, §§ 7, 50 (treaty provisions, including prohi-
bition on double jeopardy, "shall extend to all parts of federal States without any limita-
tions or exceptions"). The United States ratified the International Covenant in 1992, but
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court was later sentenced to sixty-three months for the same conduct
in federal court.83 Similarly, a defendant who received a diversionary
state disposition to a thirty-day inpatient drug rehabilitation program,
followed by expungement of his conviction upon successful comple-
tion of the program and follow-up, was subject to forty-six to fifty-
seven months of imprisonment under the applicable federal guide-
lines.84 It is not unusual for codefendants whose conduct is identical
to receive radically different sentences, depending upon whether they
are prosecuted in state or federal court. For example, one defendant
whose codefendant received no jail time in a state prosecution re-
ceived a ten-year federal sentence.85
Generally, the decision to bring charges in federal rather than
state court is made on an ad hoc basis. The United States Attorneys'
Manual (the Manual) does contain some general standards for the ex-
ercise of prosecutorial discretion, but they are written so broadly that
they provide little guidance.8 6 The Manual also contains some stan-
dards applicable to specific offenses, but, in general, these too are
stated in very broad terms. For example, the Manual lists seven crite-
ria for determining whether federal drug charges will be filed or
whether the case will be referred to state authorities. These factors
include: (1) the "degree of federal involvement"; (2) the "effective-
ness of state or local prosecutors" (including the penalties available);
(3) "the amount of the controlled substance involved"; (4) the "viola-
with reservations. See Michael H. Posner, Here and There: Human Rights Should Be a
Common Concern, Ir'L HERALD Tm., Feb. 18, 1993.
83. United States v. Woodard, 927 F.2d 433 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 502 U.S. 887
(1991).
84. United States v. Hollins, 863 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Ohio 1994). Over the govern-
ment's objections, the district court departed downward to a sentence of twelve months of
incarceration in a halfway house followed by two years of supervised release. The district
judge departed downward on the basis of the combination of the defendant's extraordinary
rehabilitation from drugs and the prejudice the defendant suffered because of the govern-
ment's delay in instituting federal charges. Id. at 569-70.
85. United States v. Palmer, 3 F.3d 300, 305 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1120 (1994).
86. See U.S. DEP'T OF JusTIcE, UNrIED STATES ATroRNEYs' MA AL §§ 9-27.000 to
9-27.750B. The Manual instructs federal prosecutors to weigh "all relevant considerations"
in determining whether to bring a federal prosecution, including "[flederal law enforce-
ment priorities," the "nature and seriousness of the offense," the "deterrent effect of prose-
cution," the "person's culpability in connection with the offense," and the "probable
sentence or other consequences." Id- § 9-27.230. The comments conclude that the weight
to be given to these factors may vary from case to case and that the list is not intended to
be all inclusive. Id. § 9-27.230 cmt. The standards themselves also state that "[a] United
States Attorney may modify or depart from the principles set forth herein as necessary in
the interests of fair and effective law enforcement within the district." Id. § 9-27.140.
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tor's background"; and (5) the backlog of cases in federal court.8 7 The
Manual does not quantify the amount of a controlled substance, but
does state that it is "only one of several factors which should be con-
sidered," and that purity and method of packaging should also be
taken into account in considering quantities.88 Other offenses are
governed only by similarly broad and flexible standards. There are,
however, a handful of offenses for which the Manual provides a cen-
tralized approval process to ensure uniformity of prosecutorial charg-
ing standards. 89 In the case of the remaining offenses, charging
discretion and any regulation of that discretion occur in the United
States Attorney's office for each district. While some offices have
charging guidelines for some of these remaining offenses, in many
cases there are no standards to guide individual prosecutors. When
standards are adopted in individual districts, the standards may vary
significantly among districts.
On occasion, federal prosecutors have publicly pursued a deliber-
ate strategy of taking only a fraction of similar or identical cases, with
the hope that the severe results in those federal cases will result in
general deterrence. For example, in the Southern District of New
York, then-United States Attorney Rudolph Giuliani initiated "fed-
eral day," one day chosen at random each week in which all street-
level drug dealers apprehended by local authorities would be prose-
cuted in federal court.90 Giuliani stated that "[t]he idea was to create
a Russian-roulette effect." Prosecutors in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a press release in 1992 describing a case that was
intended to serve as an example that would persuade defendants to
plead guilty in state court to avoid the possibility of federal charges.
The defendant who was to serve as this example to others was a small-
87. Id. § 9-101.200.
88. Id. § 9-101.200(A).
89. The RICO provisions of the Manual are the most significant provisions. See id.
§ 9-110.00 et seq.
90. Alexander Stille, A Dynamic Prosecutor Captures the Headlines, NAT'L L.J., June
17, 1985, at 48. The "federal day" program was initiated in 1983. See Stephen Labaton,
New Tactics in the War on Drugs Tilt Scales of Justice Off Balance, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 29,
1989, at Al. Mr. Giuliani referred frequently to this program in his later political cam-
paigns, asserting that it kept drug dealers off balance because they never knew when they
might be subject to the higher penalties associated with federal prosecutions. William
Glaberson, Giuliani's Powerful Image Under Campaign Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMEs, July 11, 1989,
at Al. Mayor Ed Koch identified another effect of this program: drug dealers who were
arrested by local authorities asked whether this was federal day and, if so, tried to escape.
Josh Barbanel, Koch Recommends Stiffer Penalties and More Prisons, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 15,
1985, at Al.
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time drug dealer who had rejected a state plea offer of a four-year
sentence; he was sentenced in federal court to life without parole.91
In each of these cases, federal law overlapped with state law and
federal law provided for higher penalties. While many cases fell
within the ambit of the federal statute in question, only a few of those
cases were prosecuted in federal court. While in some instances an
effort may have been made to identify particularly serious case's for
federal prosecution, in other cases the selection was random or the
criteria for selection were unrelated to the defendant's culpability.92
For purposes of this Article, the resulting differences among defend-
ants prosecuted in federal and state courts will be referred to as struc-
tural inequalities.
B. Lack of Judicial Remedies for Inequalities Resulting from Intermittent
Federal Prosecutions
Under present law there is no basis to challenge these structural
inequalities. The federal courts have uniformly rejected equal protec-
tion challenges to such disparate sentences 93 and have held that they
have no jurisdiction to review federal prosecutors' charging decisions
absent a claim of discrimination on the basis of suspect characteristics,.
such as race.94 Judicial review is unavailable even if the prosecutor's
decision to file in federal court was motivated by a desire to impose a
harsher sentence and was inconsistent with the treatment of other
offenders. 95
91. H. Scott Wallace, The Drive to Federalize Is the Road to Ruin, CrM. JuST., Fall
1993, at 8 (quoting Jim Smith, Petty Pusher Goes Out Big Time, PHMA. DAILY NEWS, July
17, 1992, at 7).
92. For example, federal prosecutors frequently agree to take cases if their state coun-
terparts are particularly overburdened. This cooperation would be entirely admirable if it
did not have the effect of arbitrarily imposing far highersentences on particular defendants
for reasons wholly unrelated to their individual culpability.
93. See e.g., United States v. Oakes, 11 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1569 (1994).
94. E.g., United States v. Armstrong, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 4040, at *19 (9th Cir.
Mar. 2, 1995) (en banc); United States v. Smith, 30 F.3d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Jacobs, 4 F.3d 603, 604-05 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); United States v. Palmer, 3
F.3d 300,305-06 (9th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 1120 (1994). See also United States
v. Ucciferri, 960 F.2d 953 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (stating that court had no discretion
to review prosecutor's decision to bring "state" cases in federal courts to take advantage of
less stringent procedural standards).
95. United States v. Jacobs, 4 F.3d 603, 604-05 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); United
States v. Palmer, 3 F.3d 300, 305-06 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1120 (1994);
United States v. Oakes, 11 F.3d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 1993) (dictum), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1569 (1994).
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One district court concluded that, in light of the enormous dispar-
ity in federal and state sentencing laws, due process requires that
there be articulated or written standards for referral to federal author-
ities, but that decision was reversed on appeal,96 and it has been re-
jected by the other circuits.97
C. Structural Disparities Among Defendants Violate Federal Sentencing
Policy
The prosecutorial policy of employing harsh sanctions in a few
cases for deterrent effect stands in sharp contrast with federal sentenc-
ing policy. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the Act) provides
that one of the factors to be considered in imposing federal sentences
is "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defend-
ants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar con-
duct."98 The Act directs the Federal Sentencing Commission to
establish policies and practices that ameliorate such disparities. 99
The legislative history stresses the importance of eliminating sen-
tencing disparity:
Sentencing disparities that are not justified by differences among
offenses or offenders are unfair both to offenders and to the public.
A sentence that is unjustifiably high compared to sentences for simi-
larly situated offenders is clearly unfair to the offender; a sentence
that is unjustifiably low is just as plainly unfair to the public. Such
sentences are unfair in more subtle ways as well. Sentences that are
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense create a disre-
spect for the law. Sentences that are too severe create unnecessary
96. United States v. Williams, 746 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Utah 1990), rev'd, 963 F.2d 1337
(10th Cir. 1992).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 4 F.3d 603, 604 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)
("[defendant's] arguments border on the frivolous"); United States v. Robinson, 967 F.2d
287, 290 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Allen, 954 F.2d 1160, 1165-66 (6th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Carter, 953 F.2d 1449, 1461-62 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2980
(1992).
98. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1837, 1990
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1988)).
99. The legislation directs the Commission to establish policies and practices that
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing,
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by miti-
gating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of gen-
eral sentencing practices ....
Id § 217, 98 Stat. 2018 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988)).
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tensions among inmates and add to disciplinary problems in the
prisons.1 00
Presumably, Congress must have been aware of the overlap of
federal and state criminal jurisdiction when it enacted the current sen-
tencing regime and aware that federal sentences would vary from
those available under state law. The legislative history gives no indi-
cation, however, that Congress was made aware of the degree to
which these factors could undermine its stated goal of ending unjusti-
fied sentencing disparities. Further, there is ample evidence that Con-
gress had a second major goal in enacting sentencing reform:
enhancing sentencing severity, particularly in the case of drug offenses
and violent crimes.101 While the goal of enhancing sentencing severity
grew steadily more important during the time Congress had sentenc-
ing reform under consideration, it never displaced the goal of reducing
sentencing disparity.10 2 To the contrary, the passage of the Sentencing
Reform Act would not have been possible without the sponsorship of
both political conservatives (who sought harsher sentences) and polit-
ical liberals such as Senator Kennedy, whose principal concern was
the elimination of unjustified sentencing disparity. 0 3
While there is an economic argument that the arbitrary selection
of a few cases for harsh sentencing is the most efficient, i.e., least ex-
pensive, means of promoting deterrence,1°4 such a practice is incom-
patible with the federal Sentencing Guidelines regime. The current
policy of removing only a few of the many identical cases for harsher
treatment in the federal system-leaving the remainder in the state
system where they will receive more lenient treatment-is the practi-
cal equivalent of selecting 1 case in 100 (or 1000) within the federal
100. S. REP. No. 225,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46 (1983), reprinted at 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3182-3562. This report accompanied the proposed Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984, which served as the source of the pertinent portions of the legislation that was
eventually enacted.
101. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223, 259, 266-69,
302-03 (1993).
102. Id. at 230-81.
103. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform: Congress and the
United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FoREsr L. REv. 291,295-96 (1993) (com-
menting on the roles played by Democratic senators such as Kennedy, Biden, Hart, and
Metzenbaum). For a detailed account of Senator Kennedy's role, see Stith & Koh, supra
note 101, at 230-66. See also William W. Wilkins, Jr., et al., Competing Sentencing Policies
in a "War on Drugs Era," 28 WAKE FoRnsEr L. REv. 305, 309-10 (1993).
104. See RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW 230 (4th ed. 1992) (con-
sidering the economic efficiency of apprehending only a few offenders and giving a harsh
sentence to each, as opposed to sentencing most offenders to a relatively mild sentence
while others who are similarly situated receive a much harsher sentence).
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system and increasing the sentence three-, four-, or tenfold in order to
obtain increased deterrence. Such a cruel lottery would make a mock-
ery of the enormous time and energy now being devoted in the federal
system to equalizing the sentences for offenders whose conduct and
criminal history are the same.
If we are on the right track with the Guidelines, and if it is impor-
tant to eliminate unjustified sentencing disparity within the federal
system, we can no longer afford to blind ourselves to the conse-
quences of failing to use the same care in selecting the class of cases to
which we apply the Guidelines as we use in applying the Guidelines to
the cases that we select for federal prosecution.
D. The Policy of Intermittent Federal Prosecutions Also Results in the
Ad Hoc Denial of State Procedural Rights to Certain
Defendants
While sentencing is probably the most important factor that moti-
vates prosecutors to bring federal charges when there is dual jurisdic-
tion, other factors provide the prosecution with an advantage in
particular cases. In one case, for example, the district court employed
its supervisory authority to dismiss a case that had no federal ties, but
had been transferred to federal court to avoid state constitutional re-
strictions on the use of informants, wiretaps, and search warrants.10 5
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that while such systematic
transfers to federal court were a source of concern, the federal courts
may not interfere with the executive's discretionary power to control
criminal prosecutions. 0 6 In addition, other provisions of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure also favor the prosecution more than the
comparable state rules. For example, the federal discovery rules are
far more restrictive than those in many states, such as Florida, and
federal joinder rules are more permissive than those applicable in
many states. These procedural differences sometimes motivate fed-
eral prosecutors to bring a case that would otherwise be pursued by
state authorities. In effect, prosecutors may forum shop in order to
gain a procedural advantage.
IH. New Principles to Limit Federal 'Criminal Jurisdiction
In light of the arguments developed in Parts I and II, any princi-
ples to govern federal criminal jurisdiction must respect the limita-
105. United States v. Ucciferri, 960 F.2d 953, 954 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
106. Id. at 954-55.
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tions that flow from the small size of the federal courts without
creating structural disparities. In order to meet these dual criteria,
this Part proposes separating the components of federal criminal juris-
diction in order to distinguish between two questions: when federal
jurisdiction over a class of activity is warranted, and if it is warranted,
whether it is necessary to employ federal judicial resources. Disaggre-
gating the elements of federal jurisdiction provides a means of recon-
ciling the mismatch between the limited capacity of the federal courts
and the breadth of federal interest in criminal justice matters. It also
requires an exploration of means that advance federal goals without
mandating prosecutions brought in the federal courts. While disaggre-
gation of federal criminal jurisdiction and greater selectivity in em-
ploying federal judicial resources are necessary, they will not
sufficiently tailor the caseload to the capacity of the federal courts.
Prosecutorial discretion will still be necessary, but it should be exer-
cised in a fashion that does not create the structural inequalities that
result from the infrequent enforcement of federal statutes against a
backdrop of general state enforcement. Discretion should be exer-
cised with a greater emphasis on guidelines which define categories of
cases that will be subject to general federal prosecution, rather than
with the intermittent discretionary selection of individual cases.
A. Prior Approaches
Prior efforts to list the criteria for federal criminal jurisdiction
have failed to match the caseload to the federal courts' capacity be-
cause these efforts have generally treated the need for federal re-
sources as a sufficient basis for federal criminal jurisdiction (at least
for some classes of cases). Some commentators treat the need for fed-
eral resources as a justification for extending federal criminal jurisdic-
tion to broad categories of cases. For example, one commentator
supports federal criminal jurisdiction when there would be economies
of scale, when the conduct in question threatens to overwhelm local
authorities, and when states are unable or unwilling to face up to cer-
tain problems.10 7 Others reject any general reliance on the need for
resources as a basis for federal criminal jurisdiction, but nonetheless
base federal jurisdiction on the need for federal resources in some
narrow class, or classes, of cases. This approach is taken in a draft
long range plan prepared for the Judicial Conference in 1994, which
107. Kathleen Sullivan, Remarks at Overlapping and Separate Spheres: A Three-
Branch Roundtable on State and Federal Jurisdiction (Mar. 7, 1994) (transcript on file with
author).
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supports federal criminal jurisdiction based on the need for federal
resources in "sophisticated criminal enterprises requiring federal re-
sources or expertise to prosecute.' 10 8
Any theory that bases federal criminal jurisdiction on the need
for federal resources is likely to produce far more cases than can fit
comfortably within the small federal judicial system. There is, for ex-
ample, tremendous expansive potential in the suggestion that federal
jurisdiction is appropriate when criminal conduct threatens to over-
whelm local authorities. If state authorities are inadequately financed,
they may be overwhelmed by even garden-variety crime. Authorities
in many states say they presently are overwhelmed by drug and vio-
lent crime caseloads. 10 9 Similarly, if federal intervention is warranted
whenever the states have failed adequately to face up to some form of
criminal activity, this criterion may be satisfied whenever state an-
ticrime efforts are unsuccessful-particularly if it can be said that re-
source constraints hampered state enforcement efforts. In short, the
federal courts do not have the capacity to accommodate all of the
criminal cases in which there is a national interest and a need for fed-
eral resources.
Even a more limited acceptance of a resource-based theory of
federal criminal jurisdiction is likely, in time, to generate a caseload
that far exceeds the capacity of the federal judicial system. As noted
above, the long range plan drafted for the Judicial Conference treats
the need for federal resources as a sufficient basis for federal criminal
jurisdiction in cases involving sophisticated criminal enterprises that
require federal resources and expertise. While this specific recom-
mendation may generate relatively few cases, it sets a precedent for
basing the scope of federal jurisdiction on the need for federal re-
sources. From this precedent, it is only a short step to reliance on the
need for resources as a justification for the extension of federal juris-
diction to much broader categories of criminal activity. Congress ap-
propriately may ask why the availability of federal jurisdiction should
turn on whether a few large enterprises are involved, rather than a
large number of individuals or smaller groups. There is no structural
impediment that prevents the state courts from adjudicating cases in-
108. COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 49, at 21. Many aspects of
this excellent draft report are fully consistent with the arguments advanced here.
109. See Hon. J. Anthony Kline, Comment: The Politicalization of Crime, in this Sym-
posium Issue.
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volving large, sophisticated criminal enterprises. 110 Moreover, it is
certainly arguable that there is as great a need for federal resources
when the scope of crime is great in the aggregate, even though many
of the individual cases are small. This has been the justification for
the creation of many new federal crimes dealing with violence and for
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in bringing federal prosecu-
tions under these statutes. It would be naive to deny that there is a
federal interest-and, indeed, a significant effect on commerce-as a
result of violent street crime. For example, the tourist industry of the
state of Florida has been hard hit as a result of highly publicized
crimes of violence committed against domestic and international tour-
ists.1"' The scope of federal interests and the genuine need for federal
resources are enormous. Once the criteria for federal jurisdiction in-
clude the need for federal resources to supplement state resources, the
number of cases that may be shifted to federal court will inevitably
balloon. Both logic and political pressure likely will force the expan-
sion of the category of cases in which the need for resources justifies
federal jurisdiction.
The core problem with prior efforts to prescribe limits for federal
criminal jurisdiction is that auxiliary federal jurisdiction long has been
used not merely when the states are structurally incapable of prose-
cuting classes of crime-as, for example, when criminal activity
crosses multiple state lines-but also when Congress deems federal
regulation desirable and when federal resources are needed to supple-
ment state resources. As long as the Supreme'Court endorses a broad
view of federal authority under the Commerce Clause,112 Congress
will have great latitude in determining when federal regulation is de-
sirable and when federal resources should be employed to supplement
110. Indeed, many states have their own organized crime statutes, many based upon
the federal RICO statute. See, e.g., COLO. RIv. STAT. ANN. § 18-17-101 et seq. (West
1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.01 et seq. (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-1 et seq.
(1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-15-1 et seq. (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.80 et seq. (West
Supp. 1994).
111. See, e.g., Anthony Faiola, For Tourism, Question Is How Bad, MLMi HERALD,
Jan. 17, 1994, at 23BM (many hotels and tour operators in South Florida had advance
bookings drop as much as 50% after murder of German tourist in front of his pregnant
wife).
112. A recent Supreme Court decision holds that Congress exceeded the scope of its
jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause in enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act.
United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, No. 93-1260, 1995 WL 238424
(U.S., Apr. 26, 1995). While this decision may be the harbinger of a narrower view of
congressional authority, the majority's opinion places some stress on the fact that there
were no congressional findings supporting the legislative judgment that the activity af-
fected interstate commerce.
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state resources in criminal enforcement. The key question, however,
should not be when federal resources are needed, but rather when
federal judicial resources are necessary to respond to some form of
criminal activity.
B. An Alternative: Differentiating the Criteria for Legislative, Judicial,
and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction
A unified focus on "federal criminal jurisdiction" is itself a stum-
bling block to analysis, precisely because the perceived need for fed-
eral resources and the scope of congressional authority so greatly
exceed the capacity of the federal courts. The proper analysis should
separate the question of when federal resources are needed-and
when Congress has the authority and responsibility to enact laws to
respond to criminal activity-from the quite distinct question of
whether it is necessary to employ the federal courts as the forum to
hear certain criminal cases. Federal legislative authority can be em-
ployed in many ways, and there are many federal resources that might
aid state and local law enforcement.
Congress can employ its spending power to supplement state and
local resources rather than enlarging either the number of federal
prosecutors and investigators or the scope of their jurisdiction. Con-
gress may authorize federal prosecutors and investigators to provide
assistance to state authorities in the development of cases to be heard
in the state courts.
Congress may also create federal crimes and establish penalties
for those offenses without requiring the trial of those offenses to take
place in the federal courts. Within the scope of its legislative author-
ity, Congress may preempt state law, and this authority might be em-
ployed to regulate some matters of state practice and procedure in
criminal cases if deemed necessary to implement federal interests.
Finally, Congress may create new federal offenses to be adjudi-
cated in the federal courts. Once the use of the federal forum is seen
as only one facet of federal criminal jurisdiction-that is, the federal
government's jurisdiction over crime-it becomes possible to consider
restricting the use of the federal forum to cases where federal judicial
resources are necessary, and to return to the question of how to en-
sure that intermittent enforcement does not perpetuate structural ine-
qualities among defendants.
The questions to be considered, then, are when and how Con-
gress should employ its legislative authority in dealing with criminal
conduct or conduct that might be criminalized, and what distinct limits
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it should place on the use of federal executive and judicial resources.
In considering these questions, the dual objectives should be to match
the caseload of the federal courts to their limited capacity and to elim-
inate the structural inequalities among defendants that are now so
prevalent.
The analysis should follow the model already employed in the
civil context, in which it is commonplace to consider separately the
questions of whether federal standards are necessary to govern behav-
ior, whether federal law should provide for a particular type of rem-
edy for certain behavior (e.g., treble or punitive damages, or
attorneys' fees), and whether to provide a federal forum. Because we
disaggregate these elements in the civil context, federal law can sweep
widely without necessarily imposing undue burdens on the federal ju-
diciary. Similar disaggregation can yield the same benefits in the
criminal context.
There are examples of such disaggregation in the criminal context
already. In general, they have involved the use of the federal spend-
ing power to subsidize state and local law enforcement (much as fed-
eral funds subsidize many other functions performed by state and
local government, including education and the provision of health
services). In the early 1970s federal funds were provided for state and
local law enforcement through the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration, and the 1994 legislation earmarked federal funds to sup-
port putting more local police on the streets, authorized grants to state
and local prosecutors for community-based justice programs,113 and
authorized grants to states to construct, expand or operate prisons
that house violent offenders. 114 Federal funding has been made avail-
able for a variety of model criminal justice programs at the state and
local levels, as well as for studies to determine the effectiveness of
innovative state and local criminal justice programs. In-kind federal
support has also been provided to state and local law enforcement
agencies. The FBI, for example, provides considerable technical
113. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§§ 31701-31702, 108 Stat. 1890 (1994) (grants to fund programs that require the coopera-
tion of prosecutors, school officials, police, social service workers, and community mem-
bers to reduce the incidents of crime by violent youthful offenders and to increase the
speed of their prosecution).
114. Id. §§ 20101-20109 (authorizing appropriations of $7,895,000,000 between the
years 1995 and 2000 for this purpose).
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assistance to state and local police. 115 The direct or indirect provision
of federal funds allows Congress to act on the belief that there is a
federal interest without imposing undue burdens on the federal
courts.
The provision of federal aid raises the question of what, if any,
conditions may or should be attached to the aid. For example, the
receipt of federal highway funds was conditioned upon state accept-
ance of 55 mph speed limits. Similarly, the receipt of federal grants
for state prisons that house violent offenders was conditioned upon
the states' adoption of "laws which require that persons convicted of
violent crimes serve not less than 85 percent of the sentence im-
posed," or upon other evidence of the severity of state sentences im-
posed upon violent offenders. 116
Conditioning federal aid upon the acceptance of federal stan-
dards formally observes the bounds of federalism while, as a practical
matter, moving the federal system toward uniform standards. Indeed,
in some cases the federal aid may be so great, or the need for the aid
so pressing, that it may be seen as an offer that the states cannot re-
fuse, thus effectively achieving uniformity. While the achievement of
uniformity greatly reduces the chances for disparity in the treatment
of offenders solely because of the jurisdiction in which they were pros-
ecuted, conditions that force uniformity are at odds with the notion,
discussed above, that decentralization and variation from state to state
is desirable in the criminal context. 1 7 However one resolves this mat-
ter, the point is that federal aims can be achieved-though, inevitably,
at some cost of loss of variation from state to state-without also im-
pairing the functioning of the federal courts. While this approach
does not identify the line between the issues that should be left to the
states and those that should be subject to a uniform national policy, it
disentangles these issues from the separate question of the appropri-
ate jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Congress also has another tool at its command to advance federal
policies regarding criminal justice while not affecting the federal
courts: it might provide in criminal-as in civil-cases that the state
courts shall have jurisdiction. This would permit Congress to define
115. For example, the FBI provides fingerprint identification, laboratory examination,
police training, and the National Crime Information Center. 1994-95 U.S. GOVERNM ENT
MANUAL 388.
116. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 20102, 108 Stat. 1816 (1994).
117. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
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the conduct in question, any defenses, and the applicable penalty-
just as it does when it creates a civil cause of action-while imposing
no burden on the federal courts.
Legislation giving the state courts jurisdiction over federal of-
fenses would raise several constitutional issues. The first of these-
whether there is any insuperable barrier to one sovereign enforcing
the penal statutes of another sovereign-is rather easily disposed of in
light of a series of decisions by the Supreme Court upholding the re-
moval of state criminal prosecutions to federal court.118 The second
issue is whether it would be permissible for Congress to authorize the
trial of federal offenses in non-Article I courts. A majority of the
Supreme Court indicated its approval of such delegations in Palmore
v. United States,119 though the case involved the legislative courts in
the District of Columbia, not state courts.1 20 While the matter may
not be entirely free from doubt, there is considerable support for the
view that state courts may be given jurisdiction over federal crimes, 21
and there are historical precedents for granting the state courts at
least concurrent jurisdiction. Several early federal statutes authorized
the state courts to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over a variety of
offenses. 122
118. The leading case is Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879). The implications of
Davis and other removal decisions are discussed in Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws
and the State Courts, 38 HA.v. L. Rnv. 545, 592-98 (1925).
119. 411 U.S. 389, 397-410 (1973).
120. For an argument that Palmore is in error unless it is read as so limited, see Joan E.
Hartman, Note, Federal and Local Jurisdiction in the District of Columbia, 92 YALE L.J.
292, 309-12 & nn.81-88 (1982).
121. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIs, Tim BusINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT 293 (1928) (arguing that state courts should assume jurisdiction over federal of-
fenses relating to liquor, narcotics, theft of interstate freight and automobiles, and minor
fraudulent schemes employing the mails); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court. The Powers of the Federal Courts, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 646, 702-05 & nn.344-350
(1982) (noting that Justice Bushrod Washington's view of nonexclusivity of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction is consistent with the discretionary nature of the lower federal courts, and
has generally prevailed); Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 516 & n.94 (1928) (same); Jon 0. Newman,
Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals to Preserve the Federal Judicial System, 56 U.
CE. L. Rnv. 761, 771-72 (1989) (arguing that state courts should assume jurisdiction over
most mail and wire fraud prosecutions and most narcotics and gambling violations, espe-
cially those involving less than some stated threshold amount of drugs or money); Warren,
supra note 118. But see Hartman, supra note 120.
122. This legislation is reviewed in Warren, supra note 118, at 548-54, 570-75, which
also discusses state and federal decisions prior to Tennessee v. Davis holding that the state
courts may not enforce federal penal laws. Id. at 577-84. This line of decisions culminated
in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 U.S. (1 Pet.) 539 (1842), which held that the state courts could
not be compelled to enforce the fugitive slave laws. For an argument that the historic
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The final issue is whether it would be permissible for Congress to
require (not merely authorize) state courts to hear federal criminal
cases. In Testa v. Katt,123 the Supreme Court held that the Rhode Is-
land courts could not refuse jurisdiction of a treble damage action
under the Emergency Price Control Act on the ground that it was
penal legislation. The Court unanimously held that "the fact that
Rhode Island has an established policy against enforcement in its own
courts of statutes of other states and the United States that it deems
penal cannot be accepted as a 'valid excuse.""' 124 Federal law is
supreme, and "the obligation of states to enforce these federal laws is
not lessened by reason of the form in which they are cast or the rem-
edy which they provide."'1 25 While Testa involved treble damages
rather than a traditional criminal prosecution, its broad language and
reasoning apply equally well to the latter.126
The text of Article III provides strong support for the view that
Congress has constitutional authority to permit or require state courts
to hear federal criminal cases. Article III left the question whether to
create lower federal courts entirely to the discretion of Congress. 127
Though the Constitution did not ensure the creation of lower federal
courts, it nonetheless reflects an expectation that there would be some
federal criminal prosecutions. Article III confers upon Congress the
power to "define and punish" piracy and other crimes committed on
the high seas and crimes against the law of nations128 and the author-
ity to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting. 29 The Constitu-
tion also defines the crime of treason. 130 Thus, Congress had the
authority to define the elements of these offenses and to set the penal-
precedents were limited to fines and penalties, not true crimes, see Hartman, supra note
120, at 310-11 n.85.
123. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
124. Id. at 392.
125. Id. at 391.
126. While the overall thrust of Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in New York
v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992), suggests that there might be Tenth Amendment
objections to a law requiring state judges to adjudicate federal criminal cases, her opinion
distinguishes Testa as an example of the "well established power of Congress to pass laws
enforceable in state courts." Id. at 2429.
127. Article III, section 1 provides that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 9 (Congress shall have the power "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court").
128. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
129. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
130. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (treason consists of "levying War against [the United
States], or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort").
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ties, even though these offenses might have been 'prosecuted in the
state courts if no lower federal courts had been created.
The availability of a state forum for some federal offenses could
shield the federal courts from disastrous overloads when Congress de-
termines that federal resources are needed to combat widespread
criminal activity or to implement federal policies on matters such as
sentencing. Indeed, trial of federal offenses in the state courts may in
fact be the only means of ensuring that some federal policies are car-
ried out as they relate to common forms of criminal activity, such as
drug violations, firearms offenses, and violent crime in general. Un-
less one assumes that the size of the federal courts really can expand
indefinitely-and that Congress is willing to pay for that enlargement
and the related costs-then it will never be possible to prosecute all
such conduct in the federal courts. If Congress wishes to implement
policies such as deterring violent crime by long and predictable
sentences under a guidelines system, or even require mandatory mini-
mum sentences, it cannot do so if only a handful of the cases can be
accommodated in the federal courts, with the remainder subject to
inconsistent state law. In order to implement congressional policy, the
federal legislative judgment must apply to prosecutions brought in
federal court as well as those brought in state court.
Providing for the trial of federal offenses in the state courts would
raise a variety of procedural issues. Would federal or state procedural
rules govern? Under the Supremacy Clause, the state courts would
have to comply with federal constitutional mandates, even if this im-
posed requirements foreign to state law or practice, such as a unani-
mous jury verdict.131 What if Congress chose to go a step further and
provided for additional procedural safeguards for defendants in fed-
eral proceedings, or provided the prosecution with additional author-
ity? Should federal law be regarded as supreme on such matters?
The same arguments would arise if Congress were to require, for ex-
ample, that state courts in which federal prosecutions were brought
follow the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.132
131. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (Justice Powell, who provided the
necessary fifth vote, concluded that states may accept nonunanimous verdicts, though Sixth
Amendment would not permit them in federal proceedings).
132. Congress may also have the option of preempting state law on pertinent issues as
it applied in state prosecutions. For example, if Congress's intention is to have all drug
offenses of a certain nature subject to a mandatory minimum penalty, it might either make
all such transactions federal offenses to which this penalty was applicable or make this
penalty applicable in state as well as federal prosecutions for conduct of this nature.
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Requiring state courts to hear federal offenses would also raise
the issue of whether Congress may impose unfunded mandates on
state and local authorities.133 This objection would be strongest if the
federal legislation required (rather than authorized) the state courts to
hear the cases in question and also required the state to assume
prosecutorial and correctional authority in the cases in question. Re-
quiring state authorities to prosecute and provide correctional services
for federal offenders would also likely run afoul of the Supreme
Court's decision in New York v. United States.34 But an objection-
based upon either the Tenth Amendment or the limits implicit in Arti-
cle I-might be raised even if Congress provided for federal funding
of the prosecutorial and correctional functions, but still imposed a
sizeable unfunded responsibility on the state courts.
While it would certainly be necessary to determine which proce-
dural rules govern and who would be financially responsible for the
prosecutorial, judicial, and executive functions, these issues should not
obscure the central point: Congress should not treat the creation of a
new federal crime to be tried in federal court as the only option when
it legislates in response to criminal activity. To the contrary, the crea-
tion of new federal crimes to be tried in the federal courts should be
the last option, and it should be limited to cases where federal judicial
resources are essential. Indeed, given the heavy criminal caseloads
under which the district courts presently labor, it would be appropri-
ate (and perhaps even necessary) to recognize a presumption against
the creation of new federal crimes that must be tried in the federal
courts.13
5
A presumption against the creation of new federal crimes to be
tried in the federal courts would respond to the structural mismatch
between the breadth of the federal authority over criminal activity
and the limited capacity of the federal judiciary. If the creation of
federal crimes to be tried in the federal courts is the first or the pri-
mary option employed by Congress, an overload in the federal courts
133. This issue has been raised most recently in cases challenging the provision in the
Brady Bill that requires state law enforcement officials to search the criminal records of
applicants for gun permits. Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994);
McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Koog v. United States, 852 F.
Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994); Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994).
134. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (holding unconstitutional the "take title" provision of the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act, requiring states to accept ownership of waste generated
within their borders or to regulate according to congressional instructions).
135. The suggestion that there be a presumption against the creation of new federal
crimes is advanced in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CR., supra note 17, at 47 (1994).
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is inevitable given the prevalence of criminal activity and the political
pressure for anticrime legislation. The predictable response to such
an overload will be greater reliance on prosecutorial discretion to re-
duce the caseload. In fact, without disaggregation and a presumption
against the trial of offenses in the federal courts, the current situation
is virtually inevitable: the federal courts will be overloaded with too
many criminal prosecutions, and ad hoc prosecutorial discretion will
create unjustified sentencing disparities among defendants.
Even if the various legal objections to state court jurisdiction over
federal offenses can be overcome, there are practical objections, the
most serious of which is that the state courts are themselves
overburdened with criminal (as well as civil) cases. Indeed, in general,
the state judges already have far heavier caseloads136 and fewer re-
sources137 than their federal counterparts. How then can shifting fed-
eral prosecutions to the overburdened state courts be a solution?
If there is a shift in federal prosecutions, it need not-and should
not-be made without accompanying resources. On the other hand, if
federal resources are to be provided, it is my thesis that they should
not necessarily be provided exclusively in the federal courts. Federal
funds may be better spent in state courts in support of purely state
prosecutions, or in state courts in support of federal prosecutions of
cases similar to those the state courts already hear. We should disag-
gregate these decisions about federalizing crime, as we are accus-
tomed to doing in the civil context.
C. Returning to the Issue of Structural Inequalities
Even if efforts are made to limit the number of federal crimes by
disaggregating the concept of federal criminal jurisdiction and em-
ploying other aspects of federal authority to advance federal policies,
it remains likely that the number of criminal cases that might be
brought in the federal courts will exceed the capacity of those courts.
There are already more than 3,000 federal crimes, and the pressure on
Congress to expand that number will be considerable. Even if Con-
gress conscientiously seeks to not exceed federal judicial capacity, it
136. Indeed, the National Center for State Courts calculates that the average state
court judge has a caseload 3 times that of his federal counterpart, and criminal filings in
state courts of general jurisdiction are 84 times higher than those in the federal district
courts. BRA.N J. OSTROM ET AL., STATE COURT CASE LOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL RE-
PORT 1991, at 40-44 (1993), cited in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 17, at 23 n.60.
137. For example, the federal judicial budget amounts to $3.2 million per judge, while
the California judicial budget only $497,000 per judge. See generally Hon. J. Anthony
Kline, Comment: The Politicalization of Crime, in this Symposium Issue.
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will be nearly impossible to predict future caseloads with sufficient
accuracy to fine tune jurisdiction to match judicial capacity. 138 In-
deed, to a large degree, caseload is as much a function of the resources
provided to federal prosecutors and investigators as it is a function of
the scope of the jurisdictional provisions. 139 The traditional solution
has been to modulate the caseload by means of prosecutorial discre-
tion, exercised largely on a district-by-district and, indeed, a case-by-
case basis. As noted above, this reduces the strain on the judiciary by
creating structural inequalities among defendants. Because the prob-
lem of structural inequality cannot be avoided altogether by disaggre-
gation and reduced reliance on the prosecution of criminal cases in the
federal courts, some additional step will be needed to winnow the
cases that fall under the legislation authorizing prosecutions in the
federal court.
Prosecutorial discretion will still be necessary, but it must be ex-
ercised primarily on a class basis, rather than an ad hoc basis, to avoid
structural inequality. As long as federal and state sentences for the
same conduct are significantly different, structural inequalities among
similarly situated defendants will occur unless uniform standards are
applied to determine which categories of cases will be subject to state
rather than federal law. Structural inequalities can be eliminated by
general federal enforcement of all cases falling within a statutory pro-
vision, or by the promulgation and enforcement of clear standards
identifying classes of cases that will be subject to general federal pros-
ecution. If Congress has determined that federal policy requires that
mandatory minimum penalties apply to certain offenses, though some
or all of the states take a far more lenient approach, it is arbitrary to
subject a few offenders to the federal mandatory minimum while most
others who are similarly situated receive more lenient treatment in the
state system. There is no arbitrariness, however, if there are consist-
ently applied criteria that distinguish the cases selected for federal
prosecution. These criteria would be equally valid if they were set by
138. It may be difficult for Congress to assess how many cases would be generated by a
given piece of legislation, even assuming full prosecution, and that number certainly would
change over time. Moreover, the capacity of the federal courts is not fixed. Rather, it
fluctuates depending not only on the number of judges in service, but also on many other
factors including, for example, the degree to which alternative dispute resolution and other
case management techniques are employed.
139. One of the reasons for the current overload in the federal courts is that the
number of federal prosecutors has grown 125% since 1980, while the number of federal
judges has grown by only 17%. COMMITtEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 49, at
8.
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Congress in the definition of the offense or by administrative action.
When no such criteria exist, the resulting arbitrariness certainly is con-
trary to the underlying policy of the Sentencing Reform Act and the
resulting Guidelines, even if it does not violate either due process or
equal protection.
The Department of Justice has recognized the potential of
prosecutorial discretion to undercut the Sentencing Guidelines, but its
response, to date, has not been successful. When the Guidelines went
into effect, then-Attorney General Richard Thornburgh took the posi-
tion that federal prosecutors were required to prosecute the most seri-
ous offense readily provable-without downward bargaining-that
the evidence would support. 140 While the Department's policy has
been moderated to a degree since the issuance of the Thornburgh
memorandum,141 it has never come to grips with the disparity between
those who are subject to federal prosecution and those who receive
different sentences for the same conduct under state law. This dispar-
ity is so great, and it involves so many individuals, that it dwarfs the
problem of disparity among the cases within the federal system.
We need an administrative, as well as a legislative, determination
of what classes of cases can be accommodated in the federal courts at
any given time. For example, if provisions such as the current broad
drug statutes remained in force, the Department of Justice should be
required to publish standards for federal rather than state prosecu-
tion. The standards should be sufficiently definite and quantifiable to
ensure that the current ad hoc decision making would not reappear in
a new guise. This recommendation is not revolutionary. To the con-
trary, academic commentators have generally supported prosecutorial
guidelines that are "specific enough to provide genuine guidance
when applied to a particular set of facts."'142 The more difficult ques-
tion, which is beyond the scope of this Article, is whether the resulting
standards should be judicially enforceable.1 43
140. Memorandum from Attorney General Richard Thornburgh to All U.S. Attorneys
(Mar. 13, 1989), reprinted in 6 FED. SENTENCNrG REP. 347 (1994).
141. The Thornburgh memorandum and the evolution of federal charging policy under
the Sentencing Guidelines are reviewed in Sara Sun Beale, The New Reno Bluesheet: A
Little More Candor Regarding Prosecutorial Discretion, 6 FED. SENMENCING REP. 310
(1994).
142. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. Rnv.
1521, 1562-63 (1981). Accord Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. Rv. 1 (1971).
143. Judicial review is the traditional remedy for abuse of administrative authority, and
there are many proponents of judicial review for prosecutorial charging decisions. See e.g.,
Vorenberg, supra note 142, at 1568-71. On the other hand, the benefits of judicial review
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It bears repeating that such an administrative effort is essential to
ensure that the congressional policy reflected in the Sentencing
Guidelines (and other sentencing legislation) is not frustrated. In-
deed, one means of effectuating federal sentencing policy would be for
Congress to enact legislation providing for the adoption of administra-
tive criteria to determine the classes of cases deemed suitable for fed-
eral prosecution. 144
Conclusion
Disaggregating the elements of federal criminal prosecution, and
considering separately when federal judicial resources are necessary,
are the first steps toward ensuring that we no longer have too many
criminal prosecutions in federal courts. Requiring the promulgation
of general and enforceable criteria that further narrow the class of
cases eligible for federal prosecution can aid in tailoring the number
of cases to the capacity of the courts. Such criteria also respond to the
problem of so few federal prosecutions that create structural inequali-
ties among defendants who are identically situated in all respects ex-
cept where they are prosecuted.
must be weighed against the costs, which would be prohibitive. Should scarce judicial re-
sources be allocated to reviewing prosecutorial discretion? For an argument that judicial
review of charging discretion would generate a great deal of costly litigation, though few
defendants would succeed, see Abrams, supra note 142, at 52. Perhaps the greatest cost of
judicial review would be political: the opposition to judicial review may be so substantial
that it would prevent the adoption of prosecutorial guidelines in the first place.
144. For a discussion of administrative regulations governing charging discretion, see 1
WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAWS 58-60 (1970).
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